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What kind of reasons can be given for thinking that education is valuable? Many 
people conceive of the value of education in instrumental terms: it facilitates economic 
and social opportunities, confers status, promotes good citizenship, and the like. By 
contrast, philosophers have generally ascribed intrinsic value to education or learning in 
its various aspects: the learned or liberal arts, the process of learning those arts, and the 
state of self-improvement or excellence a person achieves through that process. Being 
educated is supposed to promote human flourishing or a condition of human development 
and activity that is both admirable and satisfying; it is supposed to contribute to people 
being good while being good for them. To defend views of this latter kind it is necessary 
to provide an account of the nature of education, an account of what is good in general or, 
more plausibly, good with respect to human beings, and an account of the relationships 
between education and what is good with respect to human beings. What is most delicate 
in this enterprise is grounding objective claims about what is good – claims about “the 
human good.” What kind of reasons will suffice?  
I will offer the outline of an account of intrinsic value in education, grounded in a 
modestly perfectionist, non-teleological form of Aristotelianism. In doing this, I will 
draw on psychological research associated with self-determination theory (SDT) and its 
eudaimonistic account of well-being. The Aristotelian view of happiness, flourishing, or 
eudaimonia depends on the claim, a substantially empirical claim, that the virtuous 
exercise of human potentialities is what is most satisfying over the course of a life. The 
term “flourishing” expresses this claim by suggesting a fulfillment of potential that is 
deeply satisfying. If I am right, the reasons we can give for thinking education is 
intrinsically valuable are in part empirical and require recourse to psychological 
evidence. Eudaimonistic psychology is not a substitute for moral theory and educational 
philosophy, but it is arguably a valuable resource for philosophical inquiry in these 
domains.  
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Aristotle held, in a seminal formulation of the philosophical view of intrinsic 
value in education, that: 
 
We should be able, not only to work well, but to use leisure well… But 
leisure of itself gives pleasure and happiness and enjoyment of life… the 
pleasure of the best man is the best, and springs from the noblest sources. 
It is clear then that there are branches of learning and education which we 
must study merely with a view to leisure spent in intellectual activity, and 
these are to be valued for their own sake (Pol. VIII.3 1337b3031; 1338a 
1-2, 8-12; italics added). 
 
Other passages suggest that what is intended is that the most admirable pleasures 
associated with the highest virtues are also the most satisfying. Note the claim that there 
are “branches of learning” that should be “valued for their own sake,” presumably 
because intellectual activity belonging to those branches of learning is, of all the possible 
uses of one’s leisure, the most admirable and the most satisfying. These branches of 
learning that are to be “valued for their own sake” are evidently “branches of knowledge” 
or domains essential to the exercise of theoretical wisdom or sophia, a flourishing life 
being one that makes intellectual activity in accordance with that highest virtue its 
highest end: 
 
human good [eudaimonia] turns out to be activity of psyche [an active life 
of the psychic element that has a rational principle] in conformity with 
excellence, and if there are more than one excellence, in conformity with 
the best and most complete [evidently sophia or theoretical wisdom, 
which finds its completion in intellectual activity itself]… in a complete 
life (NE I.7 1098a16-18). 
 
The view that emerges from these passages is that a liberal education or education in the 
branches of knowledge should be valued because it engages learners in intellectual 
activity that is inherently valuable and rewarding, activity that is the very stuff of human 
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flourishing or eudaimonia. Note that what has come together is a conception of the 
nature of education – a particular kind of education – and a conception of the human 
good, or flourishing, predicated on a convergence between what is admirable and what is 
satisfying.  
A version of this Aristotelian view of education was advanced by Richard Peters 
(1965, 1973) and Paul Hirst (1965), with such success that it attained the status of a 
standard view associated with the early years of analytic philosophy of education. Peters, 
Hirst, and their intellectual allies developed the view that education, or liberal education, 
consists of initiation into the forms of knowledge. In justifying education, they located its 
value in the development of the mind as such, but they also invoked goods discernible 
from within the traditions of inquiry: 
 
… a mind is the product of initiation into public traditions enshrined in a 
public language… [including] forms of knowledge…  [Education] consists 
in initiating others into activities, modes of conduct and thought which 
have standards written into them by reference to which it is possible to act, 
think, and feel with varying degrees of skill, relevance and taste… The 
teacher, having himself been initiated, is on the inside of these activities 
and modes of thought and conduct. He understands vividly, perhaps, that 
some created objects are beautiful and others not; he can recognize the 
elegance of a proof, or a paragraph, the cogency of an argument, the 
clarity of an exposition, the wit of a remark, the neatness of a plot… 
(Peters, 1965: 63, 65). 
 
This view was subjected to waves of criticism, and no successor view has 
emerged. Initiation into the forms of knowledge or inquiry is, above all, an implausibly 
narrow conception of what education is, and the exercise of intellectual virtue in pure 
inquiry is neither sufficient for a flourishing life – even by Aristotle’s lights – nor 
demonstrably necessary for a flourishing life. Hirst retracted aspects of the view, 
proposing (Hirst, 1993) that education should be regarded as initiation into human 
practices. There has been some discussion of this idea, leaning on Alastair MacIntyre’s 
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(1981) account of practices and the goods internal to those practices (Strike, 2003), and 
sometimes a fusion of MacIntyre and a reading of Wittgenstein inspired by Peter Winch 
(Smeyers & Burbules, 2006), but there has been little development of it.  
Conceived as accounts of the nature and value of education, these views are 
limited by their reliance on the notion of goods internal to practices. MacIntyre argued in 
After Virtue (1981) that virtues are functionally defined with respect to tasks or roles, 
human virtues being so defined with respect to roles in the social practices of a 
community. Community membership being important to human well-being, MacIntyre 
supposed that goodness in human beings and what is good for human beings could be 
linked and grounded in this way in the idea of goods that are constructions of human 
practice; though he soon recognized the limitations of this strategy. Not all practices are 
functional with respect to human well-being, and some “goods” internal to practices 
should for that reason be regarded as not actually good. We need a way to distinguish 
good practices from bad practices, and it is hard to see how to do so except by reference 
to an independent account of human well-being and what promotes it.    
The approach I will outline is a development of the idea that education essentially 
involves initiation into human practices, and it is broadly Aristotelian in the sense that it 
aims to vindicate the idea that education can directly promote students’ flourishing, 
where that entails a convergence between subjective well-being and an admirable 
fulfillment of human potentialities. Aristotle acknowledges a variety of human 
potentialities that can be exercised in more or less admirable and fulfilling ways, despite 
his unsupportable position that only lives devoted to the exercise of theoretical wisdom in 
pure inquiry and practical wisdom in the leadership of a society are happy lives. He 
attaches considerable importance to social potentialities that find their most admirable 
and satisfying fulfillment in relationships of mutual respect, mutual appreciation each 
other’s goodness, and readiness to act for each other’s good. Aristotle also recognizes 
that human beings have productive potentialities that can be developed and exercised 
more or less admirably and pleasantly in the competent practice of diverse and more or 
less intellectually demanding arts or technai.  Because such arts make diverse 
contributions to a society’s functionality in enabling its members to live well, their 
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competent and virtuous exercise can, in a suitably arranged society, offer manifold 
opportunities for fulfilling social, as well as intellectual and productive, potentialities.  
My formulation of what education is will be openly normative and a product of 
both normative arguments about what could be justified and descriptive content that is a 
reasonable match to some of the better things that occur in schools. The approach is 
framed by a version of the Rawlsian project that will take less for granted regarding the 
design of institutions, and that will appeal to general facts about the human condition 
revealed by science – facts allowed by Rawls to be admissible behind the veil of 
ignorance.  
An account of the nature of education.  Let us begin with a philosophical thought 
experiment. Suppose it is our job to specify the nature and purpose of society’s basic 
institutions, and to do this in an impartial way. To try to ensure impartiality, let us 
suppose that we know only general truths about human existence, not our own individual 
attributes and circumstances or those of the people we happen to care about or represent. 
From behind this “veil of ignorance” what kind of society would we choose to live in?  
What would its institutions exist for? The answer I think we would converge on is that the 
institutions of society would exist to enable us all to live well – to live in ways that are 
good and that we perceive as good. Knowing that people must be enabled to develop in 
certain ways in order to live well, we would agree that these basic institutions would 
include educational ones, with the understanding that educational institutions are 
inherently ones that promote forms of development conducive to living well. We could 
distinguish educational institutions more fully by the fact that they promote such 
development by initiating learners into practices of a kind that express human flourishing 
– practices that cultivate forms of human potential in admirable and satisfying ways, 
consistent with the well-being of others. In doing this, we would observe that intellectual 
potential is developed in part through initiation into diverse modes and traditions of 
humanistic and scientific inquiry, while noting that intellectual potentials are not the only 
ones to be developed and traditions of inquiry are not the only practices whose mastery 
contributes to intellectual development. To say much more than this, we need an account 
of well-being and the relationship between its objective and subjective aspects – the 
relationship between what is admirable and what is satisfying.  
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An account of what is good with respect to human beings.  I’ve noted that the idea 
of flourishing depends on the claim that the virtuous exercise of human potentialities is 
what is most satisfying and conducive to happiness or subjective well-being over the 
course of a life. I will assume, without argument, that there are basic intellectual virtues 
pertaining to epistemic reliability and practical reason, and virtues of common morality 
pertaining to respect for others; and I will assume – because human well-being is in many 
ways obviously dependent on social cooperation – that both kinds of virtues are 
foundational to efficacious agency and living well. The good with respect to human 
beings will be partly defined by these virtues. Further virtues or excellences arise in the 
context of specific human practices, including epistemic practices, provided those 
practices are themselves conducive to human well-being. I will understand conduciveness 
to human well-being to revolve around the satisfaction of basic, universal needs of 
human nature, the satisfaction of these needs being closely associated with the fulfillment 
of basic human potentials and essential to happiness or subjective well-being. Some of 
these needs are psychological.  
Self-determination theory (SDT) is currently the only systematic view in social 
psychology that adapts an organismic perspective on human nature, agency, and well-
being. Developed by Edward Deci and Richard Ryan, it posits three innate, universal 
psychological needs closely associated with the satisfaction of human potentials and 
natural inclination toward action, exploration and learning, psychic integration, and social 
membership: the need for competence or efficacy; the need for autonomy or the 
experience of self-directedness congruent with one’s values, needs, and sense of self; and 
the need for relatedness or the experience of mutually affirming interpersonal connection. 
The fulfillment of these needs has been investigated over the course of three decades in 
connection with motivation, internalization of norms, well-being, and the bearing of 
social contexts on all of these. One of the central findings that has been replicated trans-
culturally, by research teams in a variety of countries, is that the satisfaction of all three 
of these basic psychological needs is essential to reported well-being or happiness and to 
related measures of psychological well-being, such as vitality (a sense of psychological 
and physical energy), meaning (a sense of purpose), and the absence of physical 
symptoms of stress and psychic conflict. This has been found to be true, whatever value 
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research subjects and their cultures do or don’t place on the need in question. There is 
thus reason to regard these needs as universal requirements of human well-being 
grounded in human nature, and to regard their satisfaction and the related fulfillment of 
human cognitive, social, and productive potentials in accordance with norms of 
competence and merit as central to human flourishing (Deci & Ryan, 2000; Ryan & Deci, 
2001; Ryan, Huta & Deci, 2008; Ryan, Curren & Deci, forthcoming). While there are 
many ways to produce short-term positive affect, the research indicates that enduring 
satisfaction, satisfaction over the course of a life, is associated with fulfilling human 
potentialities well in self-directed, competent activity and good relationships. Let this 
suffice, for the present, as vindication of a relaxed version of the Aristotelian axiom that 
the key to happiness is the exercise of human potentials in accordance with virtue. 
Education and the human good. I have said that educational institutions promote 
forms of development conducive to living well, and that they do this by initiating learners 
into practices that express human flourishing.  To say that these practices express human 
flourishing can now be explained. The practices in question must be ones through which 
learners can fulfill diverse human potentials and satisfy basic psychological needs for 
competence, autonomy, and relatedness. To say that the practices express human 
flourishing is to say that they give scope and expression to human potentials exercised in 
accordance with forms of excellence and moral and ethical requirements. Diverse 
practices, from reading and writing to the creative and productive arts and discipline-
based forms of critical inquiry, provide opportunities to find satisfaction in the 
development and expression of human potentials. The writing of poetry is one example of 
a human practice, and initiation into the practice of writing poetry involves the exercise 
and development of a cluster of human potentials – potentials whose exercise and 
development may be more or less rewarding and self-sustaining, depending on the 
individual. We can assume that an education essentially involves initiation into a plurality 
of such practices that will provide opportunities to experience competence, facilitate 
sociability and relationships of mutual regard, and cultivate the judgment, self-awareness, 
and habits of self-examination essential to managing our lives competently. 
Constraints of justice require that this be framed as a provision of meaningful 
opportunities to engage and develop mastery in admirable domains of human practice, 
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including practices of inquiry and critical reason, without pressure to adopt, abandon, or 
revise any specific conception of the good within the reasonable plurality of such 
conceptions. It nevertheless identifies a robust role for public schools in promoting 
human flourishing, not only in providing diverse opportunities but in nurturing forms of 
development we have reason to regard as basic to living well in any cultural setting and 
in providing for the satisfaction of basic, universal needs of human nature, including the 
need to experience competence or efficacy in challenging, self-directed activities. The 
worthiness of such activities to be taught in schools would be defined partly with respect 
to providing scope for satisfying fulfillment of potentialities, and partly with respect to 
the contributions of the practices to a society’s capacity to enable everyone in it to live 
well (i.e., the society’s capacity to provide social, civic, material necessities, etc.). A 
system of education conducive to well-being will not ignore the requirements of work 
and citizenship, but the view I am outlining would evaluate all institutions, including 
schools, for their inherent contributions to well-being, not just their instrumental 
contributions. 
All of this speaks to the intrinsic value of education’s outcome. I should note, in 
conclusion, that the intrinsic value and efficacy of the process of education depends 
substantially on the quality of the relationships, challenges, and autonomy support 
involved (Ryan & Niemiec, 2009). Education is a process of initiation, and ongoing 
fulfillment of needs for relatedness, competence, and autonomy allow it to succeed by 
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